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KEYNOTE
JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY:
HISTORY, MYTH, LITERATURE, FICTION,

POTPOURRI
PmLn B. KURLAND*
Last summer, I was enjoying my emeritus status in the mountains
of New Hampshire, in my wife's wonderful aerie-a modernly
equipped eighteenth-century farm house-where I had the difficult
chore of deciding each day whether I would recline on the open porch
on the south or the screened porch on the north. The vistas are
equally beautiful. The phone rang and I found myself listening to the
dulcet tones of Professor Norman Dorsen. He had, he said, arranged
this wonderful conference on judicial biography. It was thick with
heavy thinkers and great speakers. And our redoubtable Norman, by
way of comic relief for his conferees, had the prescience to seek a
sitting Supreme Court Justice to speak at the Friday dinner session.
But the Justices were all busy, having been booked by Professor
Arthur Miller or some other television guru for some equally appropriate (if extracurricular) judicial activities. Out of desperation, and
understanding contemporary views on adhering to budget limitations,
Norman asked me to undertake the role of top banana for the evening
and talk a little about the Supreme Court in the days before the
Flood. (Norman has long been under the illusion that I had once
clerked for Joseph Story-or was it John Marshall?)
Because Norman was Norman, and because July 1994 was so far
away from May 1995, and because my wife had just bought me a Macintosh PowerBook which she assured me would write talks all by itself, all three of us are here tonight. But do not fear, Norman
extracted from me a promise of terseness: my talk shall be no longer
in fact than an average-length Felix Frankfurter opinion-no matter
how tedious it may seem.
Let me tell you, as an aside, that I have found in my late years a
new savant who, though a lawyer, never served on the Supreme
Court: John Sparrow, onetime master of All Souls. Toward the end
of an accomplished intellectual life, he privately published a small
* William R. Kenan Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus, University of Chicago.
A.B., 1942, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., 1944, Harvard University.
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book of poems including the following, which I offer as explanation
not excuse for what I shall say:
To age and imbecility resigned
I watch the struggles of my failing mind
Lumbering along the all-too-well-worn grooves
The poor old thing moves slowly-but it moves!'
Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote in his "History" that: "There is
properly no history; only biography."'2 As with other New England
aphorists of his time, his witticisms often read as well backwards as
forwards. Certainly as to American judges other than Justices of the
Supreme Court, he might well have said: There is no biography, only
history. For with few exceptions, time tends to erase the names of
individual jurists. Even the story of the Supreme Court, to the extent
that it is marked in history, is that of an institution, perhaps best
known by the name of its Chief Justice to whom credit or blame is
often attributed for accomplishments or errors most of which are, in
fact, not of his doing.
The Roosevelt Court, as Professor Pritchett once dubbed it, was
the interregnum between the Nine Old Men who frustrated the execution of the New Deal and the Age of Aquarius, which most of you still
acknowledge as your salad days. It was this Court of the 1940s to
which Norman Dorsen referred me, probably because the young do
not believe that much of importance could have occurred before their
time. And, in a way, he was right in thinking that this period can be
regarded as antediluvian in the history of the Court. It was not the
beginning of the Warren Court philosophy of judicial power, but it
was the time when some of the shackles of precedent were loosened if
not destroyed.
Oliver Wendell Holmes often told us that continuity with the past
was not a duty, ofily a necessity. 3 The Warren Court demonstrated in
its way that the past was not even a necessity. It proved that an erased
slate was as useful as an empty one if you were allowed the premise
that no case was binding on you if you had not been a participant in its
decision. The poet W.H. Auden was not a lawyer, but he seemed to
1 John Sparrow, Eppur si muove, in Grave Epigrams and Other Verses 44 (1981).
2 Ralph W. Emerson, History, in Essays: First Series, reprinted in 2 The Complete

Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson 3, 10 (2d ed. 1979).
3 See, e.g., Oliver W. Holmes, Learning and Science, in Collected Legal Papers 138,
139 (1920) (commenting, in speech delivered at Harvard Law School, that while continuity
with past brings a "peculiar logical pleasure ....the present has a right to govern itself so
far as it can"); Oliver W. Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, in Collected Legal
Papers, supra, at 210, 211 (cautioning, in address to New York State Bar Association, that
"historic dogma" need not dictate law since "continuity with the past is only a necessity
and not a duty").
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understand the shift of the Court from a basis in thought to one in
feeling in one quatrain of "Law, Say the Gardeners, Is the Sun":
Law is the wisdom of the old
The impotent grandfathers shrilly scold;
The grandchildren put out a treble tongue,
Law is the senses of the young 4
It is not to be wondered that the same poem contains the lines: "Law
is no more, Law is gone away."5
Of course, if that is true, the subject of this conference becomes
all the more important because under such circumstances judicial action is deemed to turn not at all on the rules and facts and circumstances, but only on the personalities and idiosyncrasies of the men
and women in black robes. But that is for the learned speakers to
moot during the day. For my postprandial talk, suffice it to speak a bit
of how the Hughes-Stone Courts cleared the path for the halcyon days
then-to-come.
First, however, I would tell you that some things were a bit different in those days. For the most part Brandeis's boast that judges were
the only officials in government who did their own work was largely
still true. The Justices themselves read the briefs, including the petitions for certiorari, and themselves wrote the opinions, if often borrowing from memoranda from their clerks. But they had time for the
business at hand, although they each had but one clerk except for the
Chief (who had only two) and Mr. Justice Eugene Gressman (who
worked for Frank Murphy and did not have any). They seldom, if
ever, talked publicly about the work of the Court-except occasionally to Marquis Childs or Drew Pearson-but were rather of the view
that they should be a cloistered lot and that judicial opinions should
speak for themselves even if in somewhat arcane language. The Justices then seemed, for the most part, to lack what a reviewer of
Deirdre Bair's biography of Anals Nin in the New York Tunes called
"some of the more unfortunate distinguishing characteristics of our
age: an obsession with fame; a zeal for self-advertisement; a tendency
to confuse [law] and self-expression; a rejection of intellect in favor of
feeling; a romantic glorification of neurosis, selfishness, and irresponsibility."' 6 But that was then.
Whatever the deficiencies of the Old Court, however, it left much
room for complaint, especially among the newly dominant-in
4 W.H. Auden, Law, Say the Gardeners, Is the Sun, in A Treasury of Great Poems
1220, 1221 (Louis Untermeyer ed., 1942).
5 Id. at 1221.
6 Bruce Bawer, I Gave So Much to Others!, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1995, § 7 (Book Review), at 10 (reviewing Deirdre Bair, Ana's Nin: A Biography (1995)).
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academia at least-school of Realism. For it was still a Court and it
believed then, as some still do, in Walt Whitman's conviction "that we
ride forward on the shoulders of our ancestors."'7 Precedents still have
meaning to some, if only to point out the fallibility of even the most
supreme of judicial courts. Precedent was never regarded as a procrustean bed to which new decisions had to be shaped, but rather as a
devise for explicating a ruling and determining whether the reasons
behind the ruling were still persuasively applicable to the questions to
be addressed by the Court. The exercise of naked power-whether by
executive, or legislature, or judiciary-is beyond constitutional plan,
but it is probably least democratically justified by the appointed, lifeterm judges. It should be remembered that there were vise Justices
before Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas,
even before Justices Brennan, and Marshall, and Blackmun, from
whose antiquated opinions some wisdom might be derived even by
the more competent contemporaries who fill the bench today.
Charles Evans Hughes wrote Home Building & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell8 before Roosevelt made his first appointment to the
Supreme Court. Speaking for a five-to-four majority, and wiping out
a long series of Contract Clause decisions denying the power to extend the period of redemption on a defaulted mortgage, he said:
If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the time of
its adoption it means to-day, it is intended to say that the great
clauses of the Constitution must be confined to the interpretation
which the framers, with the conditions and outlooks of their time
would have placed upon them, the statement carries its own
refutation. 9
(Which is one of the great proofs of Holmes's dictum that "the life of
the law has not been logic." 10 )
The post-New Deal Court was saved much labor, however, because the Roosevelt Court undertook a rather substantial revision of
the constitutional landscape. It clearly marked the end, at least temporarily, of economic due process as measured by the principles of
Adam Smith." Perhaps most important, however, is what it did not
7 Malcolm A. Hoffmann, The Long Canoe 11 (1994) (imputing this conviction to
Whitman).
8 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
9 Id. at 442-43.

10 Oliver W. Holmes, The Common Law 1 (Little, Brown & Co. 1881).
n See, e.g., Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 243 (1941) (holding constitutional state
statute capping fees charged by private employment agencies); West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (holding constitutional state minimum wage law for
women and minors); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502,539 (1934) (holding constitutional
nonarbitrary state price controls on milk).
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do; for it pretty much left moribund the Equal Protection Clause of
the Constitution. The Equal Protection Clause was still, as it had been
to Justice Holmes, "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments."' 2 It was for later generations to recognize that equality was
the key by which the Supreme Court could unlock the "true meaning"
of the Constitution.
The Roosevelt Court did however begin the restoration of the
rights of black Americans in jury cases,' 3 primary election cases, 14 and
even school segregation' s and electoral gerrymandering 16 cases. Nevertheless, in 1946 the Court found that redistricting Illinois congressional districts was a political decision beyond the reach of the
judiciary if only by a plurality of the Court with seven Justices sitting.' 7 It was not until 1962 that the judiciary began the construction
of the rigid rule of "one person-one vote" for all elected offices.18
Equality of the sexes had not yet registered its meaning on the occupants of the marble palace on the hill. The best that can be said for
them was that theirs was a macho code of chivalry, not one of
equality. 19

It was the New Deal Court that effectively made the religion
clauses of the First Amendment a vital part of the Constitution,
although their meaning has still to be satisfactorily resolved. Starting
12 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200,208 (1927) (holding that state provision mandating sterilization of inmates of state-supported institutions with hereditary form of insanity did not
violate Equal Protection Clause because it was not overbroad).
13 See, e.g., Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132 (1940) (overturning conviction of black
defendant on equal protection grounds because blacks were excluded from grand jury
membership); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354,357 (1939) (holding that black defendant's
indictment for murder violated Equal Protection Clause because blacks were systematically and intentionally excluded in grand jury selection procedure).
14 See, e.g., Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 81 (1932) (holding that refusal by state election judges to allow blacks to vote in primary election, based on statute allowing political
parties to establish voting qualifications of its own members, violated Constitution). But
see Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 48 (1935) (upholding state political convention's
decision to exclude blacks from party membership because decision did not constitute state
action and thus did not violate Equal Protection Clause).
15 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337,345 (1938) (holding that provision of
legal education by state of Missouri to white but not to black residents violated Fourteenth
Amendment).
16 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960) (holding state statute that changed
municipal boundaries, thereby depriving blacks of right to vote, would violate Fifteenth
Amendment).
17 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
18 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,188,204,237 (1962) (holding that claim that votes of
residents of more populous areas were "debased" relative to those of less populous areas
was federal constitutional question and therefore justiciable).

19 See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464,466 (1948) (holding that state law prohibiting women to work as bartenders did not violate Equal Protection Clause).
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with Everson v. Board of Education,2 0 the wavering line between the
realms of church and state has been limned by the Court, not always
to the satisfaction of the partisans of either. Freedom of speech and
freedom of the press, if not raised to the level of idolatry that the
ACLU has since sought, emerged from the enchanted confines of
Holmes's and Brandeis's encouraging dissents 2 ' to become staples of
majority opinions. 22 Even motion pictures, not then highly regarded
as an art form, were protected by the Court under the First Amendment.23 But, as Susan Sontag once noted: "We linger unregenerately
in Plato's cave, still reveling our age-old habit, in mere images of the
24

truth."
The Court did prepare the way for the national government to
effectuate what would once have been considered local rather than
national policies through the Commerce Clause. The road from
Wickard v. Filburn,25 applying the Agricultural Adjustment Act to a
small family farm in Ohio,2 6 to the case of Ollie's Barbecue-sustaining the application of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to a small restaurant in Birmingham, Alabama 2 7 -was a short one but a straight
one. State interference with interstate commerce was not tolerated
20 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (holding that resolution allowing reimbursement of parents for
cost of public transportation to public and Catholic schools did not violate First
Amendment).
21 See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,672,673 (1925) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ.,
dissenting) ("If the publication of this document had been laid as an attempt to induce an
uprising against government at once and not at some indefinite time in the future it would
have presented a different question. The object would have been one with which the law
might deal, subject to the doubt whether there was any danger that the publication could
produce any result, or in other words, whether it was not futile and too remote from possible consequences."); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
joined by Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("I wholly disagree with the argument of the Government that the First Amendment left the common law as to seditious libel in force."); see
also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372, 379 (1927) (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes,
J., concurring) ("I am unable to assent to the suggestion in the opinion of the Court that
assembling with a political party... is not a right within the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
22 See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973) (per curiam) (holding efforts by
state to punish person for statement on grounds it may cause violence unconstitutional
unless statement was "intended to produce, and likely to produce imminent disorder");
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam) (holding statute calling for
punishment of advocacy violated First Amendment).
23 See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 506 (1952) (holding that state
may not ban motion picture based on censor's conclusion that film is "sacrilegious").
24 Susan Sontag, Photography, N.Y. Rev. Books, Oct. 18, 1973, at 59.
25 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
26 Id. at 114, 133.
27 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964).

HeinOnline -- 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 494 1995

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

June 1995]

KEYNOTE

however strong the local effects. 28 But that road to national power
may have reached a sharp turning point when the Court struck down
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 199029 on April 26, 1995.30
The road to making the Bill of Rights applicable to the states as
well as the national government was begun in the Roosevelt Court,
but it has had a tortuous journey. And the result has not simply been
the extension of the federal rules to the states, but, as for example in
the application of the Sixth Amendment, a diminution of its requirements in its application to the national courts to make for uniformity
between the two? 1 In the early Court, Mr. Justice Black argued that
all the first eight amendments were applicable in their crystalline clarity to the states through the Fourteenth, 32 but he also argued that Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's espousal of Cardozo's "moveable feast"- dea4
rived from Palko v. Connecticut33-was too loose and subjective
(Parenthetically, I have often wondered whether Black did not, in
fact, end up more in agreement with his old adversary Harlan than his
new ally Brennan.) In any event, if the Due Process Clause was acknowledged to be malleable by the New Deal Court, it was to become
all but limp in the hands of its successors. 3 5
28 See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 783-84 (1945) (striking down state
train-length limitations on grounds that state's inherent interest in safety was "outweighed
by the interest of the nation in an adequate, economical and efficient railway transportation system").

29

18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993).

See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995) (holding that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause authority in passing Gun-Free School Zones Act because
possession of firearm in school zone does not substantially affect interstate commerce); see
also Linda Greenhouse, High Court Kills Law Banning Guns in a School Zone, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 27, 1995, at Al.
31 See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102-03 (1970) (freeing states from requirement,
previously read into Sixth Amendment, that criminal juries must consist of 12 jurors); Hans
Zeisel,... And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38 U. ChL L
Rev. 710, 712-15 (1971) (linking trend toward smaller federal juries to Williams).
32 See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "chief object" of Fourteenth Amendment "was to make the Bill of Rights
applicable to the states").
33 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (Cardozo, J.). In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952),
Frankfurter relied on Cardozo's view in Palko that due process protects certain immunities
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberties" in reasoning that the meaning of due process
is not fixed, but needs to be determined through objective judicial deliberation on the
nature of decency, civility, and justice. Id. at 169 (quoting Palko, 302 U.S. at 325).
34 See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 174, 177 (Black, J., concurring) (criticizing majority because
"evanescent standards" and "accordion-like qualities" of its opinion "must inevitably imperil all the individual liberty safeguards specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights").
35 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-31 (1963) (rejecting view that
Supreme Court can strike down state laws perceived to be unreasonable or unwise, and
holding that state legislation will not be considered unconstitutional unless it violates specific federal constitutional provisions or federal law); NWilliamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348
U.S. 483,488 (1955) (noting that "[t]he day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process
30
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As with Abraham Lincoln, the Government found that warshot and cold-put pressures on it to which it might not have yielded in
less hectic times. In 1942, seven German saboteurs landed on the East
Coast, were captured, and were tried as spies by the military. Their
convictions were sustained at an extraordinary summer session of the
Court in July.36 It was also in 1942 that Japanese Americans on the
West Coast first had a curfew imposed on them and then were removed to what were politely called relocation centers away from the
West Coast. The Court sustained these actions 37 which had the endorsement not only of the President but of Earl Warren, who would
later sign the opinion for a unanimous Court in Brown v. Board of
Education.38 As Mr. Justice Douglas said of these decisions some
thirty years later:
The decisions were extreme and went to the verge of wartime
power; and they have been severely criticized. It is, however, easy
in retrospect to denounce what was done, as there was no attempted
Japanese invasion of our country. But those making plans for defense of the Nation had no such knowledge and were planning for
the worst.

39

When hindsight was available to the Court, it used it. Thus, in
1946, the Court announced that "martial law" imposed at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 was unconstitutional. 40 It was easy for
black-robed gentlemen sitting in Washington, D.C., in the late spring
of 1946, to decide that Oahu was not threatened by a Japanese invasion early in December of 1941, even as the American fleet was still
burning in the harbor.
The New Deal Court ended with the war. But by then the beginnings of its successor Court's reading of the Due Process Clauses had
been established. It had not yet fully established freedom from government pressures against left-wing dissenters. The real rise of the
new Right would only later be one consequence of a stupid misadventure in Vietnam, first undertaken by a well-intentioned group of political innocents in Camelot. The new Right might prove to be more
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws... because they may be
unwise, improvident or out of harmony with a particular school of thought").
36 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 48 (1942).
37 See, e.g., Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 302 (1944) (noting that evacuation and initial

detention in relocation centers was lawful); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 21718 (1944) (upholding executive order excluding people of Japanese ancestry from West
Coast war area); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 92 (1943) (upholding curfew
order).
38 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
39 DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 339 n.20 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
40 Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 324 (1946).
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recalcitrant, even less yielding to the Rule of Law, which is the Court's
only weapon. The analogue between America's "militias" of the '90s
and Europe's Redshirts, Blackshirts, and Brownshirts of the '20s and
'30s is too evident for comfort. The real test of survival is now more
likely to arise with reference to the radical Right than the radical Left,
and we have a whole new crop of civil libertarians on the horizon with
the Second rather than the First Amendment as their cornerstone.
I have encapsulated the events of the period about which
Norman asked me to speak, but I have told you nothing. I have told
you nothing because the facts are only a part of the story. Back when
Hector was a pup, and I was a law student, somebody wrote an important piece-important for the time--called "Perpetuities in a Nutshell." Somebody, I think it was Professor Bart Leach, said: "It is one
thing to put perpetuities in a nutshell, it is another to keep it there."
So it is with judicial biography. It requires more than a statement of
events during the life of the subject-and even that is difficult.
I speak as a judicial biographer manqu6. At the suggestion of
Felix Frankfurter, I undertook the biography of Robert H. Jackson. I
collected almost as much documentation for that task as Gerry
Gunther did for his volume on the Marshall Court in the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States,
before he gave it all up for a longer and worthier project on Judge
Learned Hand. 41 The biographical job was well beyond me. It required imagination and skills not readily available to the workaday
law professor.
A judicial biography requires of the biographer a thorough
knowledge of the experiences of the subject's life; of the mores of the
time, public as well as private; of judicial precedents and decisions; of
relationships of the subject to other individuals, to groups, and to institutions. If there were a checklist, it would be almost endless.
But why write judicial biography at all? Robert H. Jackson had
an interesting career before he got to the Court. He was a noted advocate at an early age in the courts of upstate New York, with something of the Horatio Alger hero about him. He came to Washington,
played David to Andrew Mellon's Goliath, and then moved steadily
up the Department of Justice ladder to attorney general, meanwhile
becoming a friend of F.D.R., who found in him an able public spokesman for the New Deal. He clearly had aspirations for the presidency,
at first through the governorship of New York. But he was frustrated
here in part because James A. Farley's ambitions were inconsistent
41

Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand: The Man and the Judge (1994).
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with his and, in part, in my mind, because there was more integrity
than populism in his makeup.
Jackson was never fully taken with the cult of the robe. He was
an advocate at heart. Brandeis said Jackson should be made solicitor
general for life. Nuremberg was, to him, his crowning achievement. It
must have left a bitter taste as it denied him the center chair on the
Court. I mention these things because Jackson's life was more dramatic and appropriate for storytelling than that of most jurists.
It does, however, suggest one reason for judicial biography: to
tell a tale with all the drama and suspense of a good novel, except that
the plot happens to be true. But truth is a terrible restraint to impose
on any writer, and particularly on those whose business is most often
some form of advocacy.
Judicial biography ordinarily cannot merely be a response to the
Bible's admonition "to praise famous men, ' 42 for there are few such
important public servants who are so faceless in our history as are the
members of the judiciary. And, as Frankfurter once wrote of that biblical phrase:
[It] was not an exhortation for a gesture of pietistic generosity, the
placing of verbal flowers on the graves of famous men. It is for our
sake that we are to praise them, for, as Ecclesiasticus added, they
have given us an "inheritance." We commune with them to enlighten our understanding of the significance of life, to refine our
faculties as assayers of values, to fortify our will in pursuing worthy
ends.

43

In sum, a judicial biography could be not merely an encomium but a
vade mecum. It could provide a role model. How often does it do so?
Then there was Judge Jerome Frank's theory that judicial biography served the function of showing what mortals these fools be.44 Of
course, judicial biographies could, like literary biographies, lead to understanding of the corpus of the subject's judicial efforts by helping to
read his judgments in light of his behavior. But, as one brought up as
a "judicial realist," I remain dubious about the effect of a judge's ingestion on his jurisprudence. Fortunately, few judicial biographies, if
any, seem to have concentrated on the sex life of a judge as they have
so often of an executive. (I found Sheldon Novick's sleek recent efEcclesiasticus 44:1 (Oxford Annotated with the Apocrypha).
43 Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, 105 U. Pa. L. Rev.
781, 781 (1957), reprinted in Of Law and Life and Other Things That Matter 77,77 (Philip
B. Kurland ed., 1965) (quoting Ecclesiasticus 44:11 (Oxford Annotated with the
Apocrypha)).
44 See, e.g., Jerome Frank, Law and the Modem Mind 114-15 (1930) (noting that judicial biography can reveal life experiences which inevitably influence judge's
decisionmaking).
42
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fort to make a Lothario out of Holmes by innuendo somewhat less
than persuasive 45 ) Judges appear to have freed pornography from
most government restraint without becoming addicted. Or at least, if
they have, we have not been told.
A few weeks ago, we saw Tom Stoppard's Arcadia4 played on its
native soil. It would suggest that time and place are basic ingredients
in any attempt at a credible history whether of a person or of events
or of an institution. 47 The Derbyshire countryside and earlynineteenth century inform Arcadia as much as the playwright's words.
Perhaps even closer to the subject of our conference deliberations are
the differences between the events known to the participants and the
same events as perceived by their successors some generations later;
however much those perceptions rest on documents, some preserved,
some altered, some imagined. The ambiguity of the past impresses,
even when documents are dealt with without malice aforethought by
those who originally made them, tore them up, or amended them.
Anyone who has been associated with a public event must be well
aware of the perversions of fact that are daily reported in the journals
of record or even more sober publications and then recounted in serious scholarly tomes.
But these are not the only roadblocks to successful judicial biography. The task is a very difficult one, and I would here touch on but
a few of the more egregious problems and then call it quits.
The first of these is the all but universal, if unconscious, confusion
between the biographer and his subject; not in the details of the life
but in the biographer's ascriptions to his protagonist of his own views,
his own mental constructs. Dean James F. Simon once used the
phrase "in his own image" as a title for a book on the Court.48 What
better title could there be for a typical Supreme Court Justice's biography? A rather happy example of the conversion may be found in
Learned Hand's pieces in The Spirit of Liberty49 which were devoted
to the judicial thought of Brandeis,50 Stone,51 and Judge Thomas
45 See Sheldon M. Novick, Honorable Justice 227, 234 (1989).
46 Tom Stoppard, Arcadia (London: Faber & Faber, 1993).
47 See, e.g., Simon Schama, Landscape and Memory (1995) (exploring cultures as interpretations of, and themselves inexorably shaped by, history and specifics of local physical
landscape).
48 James F. Simon, In His Own Image: The Supreme Court in Richard Nixon's
America (1973).
49 Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty (Irving Dillard ed., 1952).
50 Learned Hand, Address at the Meeting of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Memory of Justice Brandeis, 317 U.S. xi (1942), reprinted as Mr. Justice
Brandeis, in Hand, supra note 49, at 155.

51 Learned Hand, Chief Justice Stone's Conception of the Judicial Function, 46 Colum.

L. Rev. 696 (1946), reprinted in Hand, supra note 49, at 201.
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Swan 52 and which certainly revealed at least as much about Hand's
judicial approach as about theirs. With most authors we should prefer
to learn of their subjects' attitudes and points of view.
Equally, the treatment of a biographical subject as a faultless
hero is a common problem. Judges do not ordinarily make good idols.
Religious idols should not have clay feet. Not even Holmes was
' 53
benefitted from his characterization as the "Yankee from Olympus."
Perhaps, we should have more of the intellectualization, so to speak,
of the judicial figure: a better picture of his or her mind as well as his
or her actions. I am reminded again of a Learned Hand statement,
and again it probably tells more about him than about his judicial
colleagues:
I venture to believe that it is as important to a judge called upon to
pass on a question of constitutional law, to have at least a bowing
acquaintance with Acton and Maitland, with Thucydides, Gibbon
and Carlyle, with Homer, Dante, Shakespeare and Milton, with
Machiavelli, Montaigne and Rabelais, with Plato, Bacon, Hume and
Kant, as with the books which have been specifically written on the
subject. For in such matters everything turns upon the spirit in
which he approaches the question before him. The words he must
construe are empty vessels into which he can pour nearly anything
he will. Men do not gather figs of thistles, nor supply institutions
from judges whose outlook is limited by parish or class. They must
be aware that there are before them more than mere verbal
problems; more than final solutions cast in generalizations of universal applicability. They must be aware of the changing social tensions in every society which make it an organism; which demand
new schemata of adaptation; which will disrupt it, if rigidly
confined. 54
There were judges of the '30s and '40s who will never be captured
between the covers of books. The values involved in good judging are
too hard to define. It was once said by a professorial colleague about
Alfred North Whitehead: "[H]is significance as a person far outranked his importance as a philosopher. ' 55 So, too, with these judicial
subjects. We are not sure of our bases for evaluation. Yesterday we
applauded judges who wrote opinions expressing arguments delineating persuasive reasons, whether legal, historical, political, economic,
52 Learned Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 Yale LJ. 167 (1947), reprinted in Hand,
supra note 49, at 209.
53 Catherine D. Bowen, Yankee from Olympus (1944).
54 Learned Hand, Sources of Tolerance, 79 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 12-13 (1930), reprinted in
Hand, supra note 49, at 66, 81.
55 Letter from Felix Frankfurter to David Riesman (Oct. 10, 1957) (available in
Harvard Law School Library).
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or sociological, for particular judgments. Today we extol the judge
who can persuade a majority of his brethren to reach a conclusion in
keeping with his personal instinctual predilections. Judging is rhetoric
whether John Marshall style, or Oliver Wendell Holmes style, or
Louis D. Brandeis style, or William J. Brennan style.
And this brings me, you'll be glad to hear, to my last proposal:
that biography, like all history, often is to a very large degree myth.
My point here is not Henry Ford's that "history is bunk," but rather
the insistence of many professional historians that the gossamer line
between what occurred in the past and what is believed to have occurred in the past may not differ in their importance for the present.
John Mortimer, renowned in part as Boswell to Rumpole of the Old
Bailey, concluded the second volume of his memoirs thus:
I have not been writing a novel, although once you decide what to
leave out, or how you feel about an event that happened, or how
you would like the reader to see it, you are on your way to inventing
a myth. Politicians describing the economy, lawyers and judges
describing a crime, every one of us re-inventing our pasts, are mythmakers to a greater or lesser degree. Fiction is what comes naturally to us.7
"Literature is a luxury;" said Chesterton, "fiction is a necessity."Ss
One trouble with much judicial biography has been too much necessity-and too little luxury. And I would tell you that the grapes of one
who can afford you neither necessity nor luxury are very sour indeed.

56 See William H. McNeill, Mythistory and Other Essays 3-22 (1986) (defending conflation of myth and history as indiscemibly different and mutually reinforcing); Schama, supra
note 47, at 14-15 (recognizing that landscape traditions which shape national identity and
other contemporary institutions were "built from a rich deposit of myths, memories, and
obsessions").
57 John Mortimer, Murderers and Other Friends 260 (1994).
58 G.K. Chesterton, The Defendant 10 (1901).
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